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Using a new panel dataset for banks in eight West African countries, we explore the 
factors that exacerbate or alleviate excess liquidity, and the factors that promote or 
retard the rate of growth of banks‟ assets. Loan default rates in the region are high, and 
variations in the rate impact on liquidity and asset growth. However, the size of this 
effect is very sensitive to bank age. Some types of improvement in the quality of 
governance reduce excess liquidity and promote asset growth. However, the impact of 
other types of improvement, particularly with regard to corruption, is ambiguous. We 
uncover evidence that provides an explanation for this ambiguity. 
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Banks  and  other  financial  intermediaries  can  perform  an  important  developmental  function, 
especially in Africa, where alternative sources of finance are limited or non-existent. By providing 
firms with essential finance, they help them to take advantage of productive investment opportunities 
which may not otherwise materialise. By screening loan applicants, they can help to address adverse 
selection in the credit market and channel funds towards productive uses. By monitoring borrowers, 
they can contain moral hazard behaviour, for example, excessively risky investment activity that 
could  undermine  a  borrower‟s  ability  to  repay  a  loan.  Through  long-term  bank-borrower 
relationships, well established banks can address both adverse selection and moral hazard. This not 
only  helps  banks  to  remain  solvent  but  also  ensures  that  bank  finance  is  channelled  towards 
productive and sound investments.  
There is a large body of empirical evidence which suggests that the development of banking systems 
goes  hand  in  hand  with  economic  development  (see  for  example  Levine,  2004).  Although  the 
evidence on causality is mixed, there is broad consensus that well functioning banking systems can 
and do promote economic growth (Demetriades and Andrianova, 2005). It is, therefore, a puzzle that 
so  many  countries  remain  financially  under-developed.  This  is  particularly  true  of  Sub-Saharan 
Africa, which remains one of the most financially under-developed regions in the world. A recent 
study by the World Bank has shown that African banking systems lack depth compared to other 
regions in the world but are also excessively liquid (Honohan and Beck, 2007). According to the 
World Bank, banks themselves complain that there is a lack of creditworthy borrowers while at the 
same time households and firms find finance as a major constraint in their activities. The evidence 
presented by the World Bank also suggests that the least developed banking systems are also the 
most  liquid  ones,  hence  the  implication  is  that  excess  liquidity  is  a  feature  of  financial  under-
development. 
This  paper  aims  to  shed  light  on  both  these  features  of  financial  under-development  in  Africa, 
utilising  a  panel  data  set  that  includes  all  banks  operating  in  the  West  African  Economic  and 
Monetary Union (UEMOA) during 2000-20005. The UEMOA provides a uniform financial system 
across eight countries; the structure of this system has changed little in the last 15 years. Therefore, 
we can be sure that the variations in bank behaviour we observe within the UEMOA are not due to 
variations in the nature of public financial institutions which the banks face. This makes feasible the 
identification of the institutional sources of the variations in bank behaviour, which are not correlated 
with  variations  in  the quality of public financial  institutions.  Our  dataset  includes  balance sheet 2 
 
information on each bank in the UEMOA, including information on loan defaults as well as bank 
characteristics such as age and ownership type. We use the default data to calculate average loan 
default rates in each country, which we use as a proxy for the quality of borrowers that banks face in 
the country. We combine this information with macroeconomic data including institutional quality 
indices  constructed by the World  Bank. Our dataset  enables us  to  examine the extent to  which 
informational  and  institutional  factors,  and  interactions  between  different  factors,  can  explain  a 
bank‟s loans to assets ratio, which is an inverse measure of bank liquidity. Our dataset can also be 
used to examine the microeconomic and macroeconomic determinants of bank asset growth. 
Our results suggest that both features of financial under-development highlighted by the World Bank 
report can to  a large  extent be attributed to  severe informational  problems.  These problems  are 
particularly acute for younger banks, while the more established banks are less affected. Thus our 
results highlight the critical importance of information capital in both developing banking systems 
and reducing excess liquidity. Our results suggest that it is not so much the lack of credit worthy 
borrowers that is the obstacle but the lack of a developed infrastructure that would enable new banks 
to screen and monitor borrowers. This result is consistent with evidence on the importance of credit 
registries in reducing credit constraints (Galindo and Miller, 2001). Our results also suggest that bank 
development in Africa does indeed follow economic development but it is also sensitive to political 
stability. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, our findings suggest that the control of corruption 
affects different types of banks differently. Only the younger domestically owned private banks are 
found to benefit from this. 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  the  institutional  setting  within  which 
commercial banks in the UEMOA operate, and provides the conceptual background for our analysis. 
Section 3 describes the data and modelling strategy. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical 
findings. Section 5 summarises and concludes.  
 
2. Commercial Banking in the UEMOA 
The UEMOA is a monetary union arising from the final phase of French colonialism in West Africa 
(1948-1962), and encompasses most of France‟s former colonies in the area. The current member 
states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d‟Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau,
1 Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. It 
forms part of the Franc Zone, the other main component of which is  a second monetary union, the 
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC).  The cornerstone of the Franc 
Zone is the use of currencies that the French Treasury guarantees to exchange for E uros at a fixed 
                                                 
1 Guinea-Bissau is a small, relatively underdeveloped former Portuguese colony. It joined the UEMOA in 1985. 3 
 
rate. (Rather confusingly, the UEMOA currency and the CEMAC currency are both called the CFA 
Franc, although they are two entirely different currencies.
2 The arrangements that the two monetary 
unions have with the French Treasury are parallel but entirely independent of each other.)  
The enduring institutional link with the former colonial power gives the UEMOA  countries  an 
unusually high level of financial stability, compared to other African countries with similar levels of 
economic development.  The institutional framework is defined by a constitutional a ccord dating 
from the period in which the colonies became fully independent (1960 -1962), and preserving many 
of the features of the financial system of post -war French colonial Africa. The main features are as 
follows. 
(i)  Guaranteed  convertibility.  Article  1  of  the  accord  stipulates  that  France  will  help  UEMOA 
member states to ensure the free convertibility of their currency. In practice, this means that the 
French Treasury will exchange CFA Francs for Euros on demand. Lending by the BCEAO (the 
UEMOA central bank) to domestic governments and to the private sector is now limited by rules 
designed to prevent free-riding on the French guarantee. 
(ii) A fixed exchange rate. Up until 1994, Article 2 of the accord stipulated a fixed rate of 50 CFA 
Francs to one French Franc. The rate has been changed only once, to 100:1, in January 1994. The 
entry of France into the European Monetary Union means that the rate is now defined in terms of 
Euros, but the current Euro rate (655.957:1) is equivalent to 100:1 against the French Franc.  
(iii) Free transferability. Article 6 of the accord describes the „freedom of financial relations between 
France and members of the Union‟. This obligation on the part of the African states is not without 
qualification, and the practice of member states has not always been in harmony with the principle. 
International  capital  transfers  are  taxed,  and  occasionally  (especially  during  the  run-up  to  the 
devaluation  in  1993)  the  transferability  has  been  suspended.  Nevertheless,  there  is  usually  a 
reasonable degree of capital mobility between the UEMOA and France.  
(iv) Harmonization of rules governing currency exchange. Article 6 of the accord notes that the 
„uniform regulation of the external financial relations of member states ... will be maintained in 
harmony with that of the French Republic‟. These regulations cover such things as the remittance of 
salaries abroad (that is, outside the Franc Zone), foreign investment and borrowing from abroad. 
                                                 
2 CFA originally stood for Colonies Françaises en Afrique. It now stands for Communauté Financière Africaine (for the 
UEMOA currency) and Cooperation Financière en Afrique (for the CEMAC currency). 4 
 
(v) A common regulatory framework. Regulation of the banking system is the responsibility of the 
UEMOA  Banking  Commission,  which  was  created  in  1990  with  French  technical  support.  The 
commission has oversight over the day-to-day activities of all banks and other financial institutions 
in the UEMOA, and has the power to intervene in the operations of individual banks when its rules 
are infringed. In the case of serious infractions, the commission can impose disciplinary sanctions of 
differing degrees of severity, ranging from a formal warning to the dismissal of senior bank officials 
and suspension of a bank‟s activities. Commission staff produce regular reports on the extent of 
compliance with UEMOA banking regulations; the loan default data used in this paper are taken 
from statistics compiled by the Banking Commission. 
The financial stability provided by these institutions means that commercial banks in the UEMOA 
are free from some of the uncertainties facing financial institutions in other parts of Africa; the same 
is true of depositors. However, other risks remain. Firstly, many banks are likely to face a serious 
adverse selection problem arising from variations  in  borrowers‟ creditworthiness.  In theory, this 
should depress the equilibrium volume of loans (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, 1983). Existing evidence 
indicates that the magnitude of the problem can vary across countries and over time, and is likely to 
depend not only on institutional quality but also on business cycle variables (Fuentes and Maquiera, 
2001; Koopman et al., 2005). One measure of the average level of creditworthiness in a country is 
the average rate of default on loans. (A higher default rate entails lower creditworthiness.) As we will 
see later, the rate of default on bank loans exceeds 10% in our sample. However, there is a great deal 
of variation in the average default rate across countries and over time: in some countries the rate 
sometimes dips below 5%, while in others it occasionally exceeds 30%. Variations in the overall rate 
of default in a country could have a large impact on the profitability of lending, and therefore on both 
the loans-assets ratio and the rate of growth of bank assets and liabilities.
3  
Secondly, corruption could make loans less profitable, if it means that banks are forced to ignore the 
commercial worth and riskiness of projects they finance for the political elite.  Direct evidence of 
such corruption in Kenya is discussed by Bigsten and Moene (1996), and evidence for a link between 
the corruption of bank officials and the producti vity of investments is discussed by Beck  et  al. 
                                                 
3 There is also some variation in default rates across banks. One alternative modelling strategy is to condition bank 
behaviour on bank-specific rather than national default rates. However, we do not have reliable information on what 
proportion of the observed default on the loans of an individual bank is predictable, and what proportion is due to 
unobservable random shocks that should not influence bank decisions in the future. The noise-signal ratio for bank-
specific default rates is likely to be much higher than the national default rate. 5 
 
(2005). Such corruption will tend to reduce the loans-assets ratio, and may also depress asset and 
liability growth (unless the banks in question raise deposits from the corrupt elite).  
Thirdly, the quality of contract enforcement and overall political stability in the country could affect 
the extent of moral hazard that banks face when making loans. Institutions promoting the rule of law 
are likely to enhance banks‟ ability to enforce loan contracts, and hence increase a bank‟s willingness 
to lend and to grow (Messick, 1999). Institutions could act as a deterrent to moral hazard behaviour 
by borrowers, helping to reduce the degree of moral hazard faced by banks when they make loans. 
Governments of some UEMOA countries have enacted legislation to facilitate the recovery of bad 
debts of individual banks (for example, the BHM in Mali); however, such support for banks is by no 
means universal. 
These factors must be interpreted bearing in mind that many of the banks in our sample are very 
young. For 25% of our observations, the age of the bank is seven years or less. For very young 
banks, raising deposits is likely to be easier than identifying reliable borrowers. Older banks are 
likely to have more information capital so that their ability to screen borrowers is likely to be better 
than that of younger banks. The adverse selection problem is likely to be more acute for younger 
banks, at any given average quality of borrowers. Very young banks are likely to channel most of 
their  resources  into  building  up  their  deposit  base,  and  deposits  might  in  the  first  instance  be 
channelled into foreign  assets  or claims on other domestic financial  institutions  rather than into 
business lending. Therefore, very young banks will have a higher total asset and liability growth rate 
and a lower loans-assets ratio, ceteris paribus. These young banks may also be less sensitive to 
historical default rates in the country, if the few new borrowers they identify are atypical of existing 
borrowers. A reduction in the default rate will raise their loans-assets ratio by a smaller amount, and, 
have less of an impact on their asset growth. 
Bank age may also affect the impact of political stability and rule of law on both deposit growth and 
the loans-assets ratio. Stability may make it easier to form relationships with new depositors, who 
make  up  a  larger  fraction  of  the  customers  of  new  banks,  as  well  as  to  identify  reliable  new 
borrowers. In this case, the impact of stability on deposits on asset and liability growth will decline 
with bank age. If very young banks face high costs in identifying reliable borrowers, then the growth 
in deposits following a rise in stability may outstrip their capacity to make new loans, in which case 
their loans-assets ratio may fall, even if that of older banks is rising. 
The effect of controls on corruption may also vary with bank age. Some older banks with ties to the 
political elite may benefit from corruption, insofar as the elite deposit some of their earnings with 6 
 
these older, established banks. In this case, controlling corruption will reduce older banks‟ deposit 
growth, and may benefit younger banks with weaker ties to the political establishment. (However, in 
testing such a hypothesis, we will also need to control for other bank characteristics, such as the 
extent to which they are state- or foreign-owned.) On the other hand, controlling corruption should 
encourage all banks to lend a larger fraction of their assets. Even banks benefitting from the deposits 
of the corrupt elite will be encouraged to lend a larger fraction of their assets, if the loans don‟t have 
to be to the elite. 
All of these factors are relevant to most African countries. However, in most African countries they 
are correlated with financial stability, and therefore difficult to identify precisely. We restrict our 
attention to banks in the member states of the UEMOA in the period 2000-2005. In our sample, the 
quality of the financial system is uniform over time: there has been no major revision of UEMOA 
legislation in this period. It is also uniform across countries: there is a single authority – the Banking 
Commission  –  responsible for regulating  all banks  in  the monetary union.  We can therefore be 
confident that the effects we identify are not due to variations in the quality of the financial system, 
but to underlying political institutions. The next section describes the formal model capturing the 
effects described in this section – a model of the loans-assets ratio and of real asset growth – and the 
data to which the model will be fitted. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The  loans  and  assets  data  used  in  our  econometric  model  are  taken  from  the  annual  BCEAO 
publication Bilans des Banques et Etablissements Financiers.
4 These data are used to construct two 
dependent variables  for bank  i  in  year  t:  the  loans-assets  ratio  (RATIOit)  and  real  asset  growth 
(GROWTHit). Annual data are available for 113 banks in the UEMOA over the period 2000-2005: 15 
in Benin, 14 in Burkina Faso, 27 in Cote d‟Ivoire, two in Guinea-Bissau, 16 in Mali, 11 in Niger, 17 
in Senegal and 11 in Togo. RATIOit is constructed as the ratio of commercial loans (“créances sur la 
clientele”) to total assets (“total de l‟actif”). GROWTHit is constructed as the annual change in the log 
of total assets less the annual change in the log of the consumer price index reported in the BCEAO 
Annuaire Statistique. Some banks came into existence in the middle of the sample period, so we have 
an unbalanced panel. 
The  econometric  model  also  incorporates  a  number  of  explanatory  variables,  as  follows.  The 
countrywide default rate facing bank i in year t (DEFAULTit) is the ratio of the total bad debt of all 
                                                 
4 All publications mentioned in this section are available online at www.bceao.int. 7 
 
commercial banks in the country in which bank i operates to the total commercial lending of those 
banks.  The  figures  for  bad  debt  (“crédits  en  souffrance”)  are  taken  from  the  UEMOA  Banking 
Commission‟s Rapport Annuel. This publication is also the source of data on the fraction of bank 
capital  owned  by  the  government  (GOVERNMENTit)  and  foreigners  (FOREIGNit).  Data  on  the 
number of years each bank has been in operation by year t (AGEit) are taken from the BCEAO 
publication Annuaire des Banques et Etablissements Financiers de l’UEMOA. Data on real GDP 
growth  in  the  country  in  which  a  bank  is  operating  (GDPGRit)  are  taken  from  the  Annuaire 
Statistique. 
Figures 1-6 illustrate the sample distributions of some of the bank characteristics. It can be seen from 
Figure 1 (RATIO) that a majority of banks lend between 40% and 70% of their assets. However, 
there is also a substantial fraction lending over 80%, and some lending less than 20%. Figure 2 
(GROWTH) shows a similarly wide dispersion in asset growth rates. The percentage annual growth 
rate for the average bank is in single figures. However, a substantial fraction experience annual 
growth in excess of 20%, while others see assets fall by over 20%. It remains to be seen which bank 
characteristics – if any – explain the wide dispersion of both RATIO and GROWTH. Figures 3-6, 
which illustrate the distributions of AGE and of the bank ownership variables, indicate considerable 
heterogeneity in these characteristics. A substantial majority of banks are very young, having been 
established only in the 1980s or later; however, others predate the independence period. Banks that 
are entirely owned by foreigners, or by the government, or by the domestic private sector, are very 
common; however, most banks have mixed ownership. 
In  order  to  capture  the  effects  of  variation  in  country-specific  corruption  and  ease  of  contract 
enforcement,  we  make  use  of  the  indicators  reported  in  the  World  Bank  World  Governance 
Indicators. These indicators are described and discussed in Kaufmann et al. (2007). Our measure of 
the  extent  to  which  a  country  is  corruption-free  is  the  “control  of  corruption”  index  in  World 
Governance Indicators. For bank i in year t, CONTROLit indicates the value of the index for the 
country in which the bank operates. There are several different governance indicators that may be 
associated  with  ease  of  contract  enforcement:  “rule  of  law”  (LAWit),  “voice  and  accountability” 
(VOICEit),  “political  stability”  (STABILITYit),”government  effectiveness”  (EFFECTit)  and 
“regulatory quality” (QUALITYit). These indictors are quite highly correlated with each other, so it 
does not make sense to include them all in a single regression equation. However, there are no strong 
a priori grounds for supposing that one particular indicator is an especially good measure of the 
extent to which banks are protected from moral hazard effects. The methodology section that follows 
explains how we deal with the multicollinearity of the governance indicators. 8 
 
Descriptive  statistics  for  the  variables  in  our  model  are  presented  in  Table  1.  Note  that  the 
governance variables are normalised so that the mean of each is equal to zero across a worldwide 
sample.  Negative  means  in  our  sample  indicate  that  the  UEMOA  countries  perform  below  the 
worldwide average in terms of governance, despite their financial stability. On average, the ratio of 
loans to total assets is 57% (low by international standards) and the ratio of defaults to total loans is 




The discussion in section 2 indicates that the loans-assets ratio (RATIO) may depend on the loan 
default rate in the country (DEFAULT), control of corruption (CONTROL), the quality of contract 
enforcement (as captured by one of the other governance indicators), and bank age (AGE). Bank age 
may  also  affect  the  impact  of  changes  in  the  default  rate,  control  of  corruption  or  contract 
enforcement on the loans-assets ratio. Since we are using panel data, we should also allow for fixed 
effects, and for some persistence in the loans-assets ratio, which can be captured by including a 
lagged dependent variable. 
The different governance indicators are quite highly correlated with each other, so fitting a model 
with more than two indicators does not produce significant coefficients. A sensible model of RATIO 
will  therefore  include  CONTROL  plus  one  other  indicator  to  capture  the  ease  of  contract 
enforcement. We have no strong a priori view on which of these indicators best captures the contract 
enforcement  effect,  so  we  fit  several  different  models,  each  with  a  different  indicator  (LAW, 
STABILITY, VOICE, EFFECT, QUALITY). The best-fitting model, reported in Table 2, is the one 
incorporating LAW. This model is of the form:  
 
RATIOit = t + i + ∙RATIOit-1 + ∙ AGEit + [0 + 1 ∙ AGEit] DEFAULTit       (1) 
  + [0 + 1 ∙ AGEit] CONTROLit + [0 + 1 ∙ AGEit] LAWit + uit 
 
The    and    parameters  capture  time  and  bank  fixed  effects,  and  u  is  a  regression  residual.
5 
Alternative models, in which  LAW is replaced by STABILITY, VOICE, EFFECT or QUALITY, are 
reported in Appendix Table A1. Since LAW and CONTROL are correlated with each other, we also 
                                                 
5 There will be some heterogeneity in the performance of banks that is difficult to measure or observe. Some banks lend 
almost exclusively to firms in a specific sector; for example, a number of agricultural banks in the Sahelian countries are 
highly exposed to the cotton-producing sector.  9 
 
explore  the  effect  on  our  model  of  imposing  the  restriction  0  =  1  =  0,  and  of  imposing  the 
restriction 0 + 1 = 0. Table 2 reports these results also. 
Our second model is designed to explain variations in banks‟ real asset growth (GROWTH). Our 
modelling  strategy  is  similar  to  the  one  above.  However,  the  GROWTH  model  contains  two 
additional effects. Firstly, in modelling asset growth we should control for the size of the economy in 
which a bank is operating. Secondly, as noted in section 2, we need to test whether the effect of 
governance on asset growth depends on the structure of bank ownership. If a larger share of the bank 
is owned by the government or by foreigners, this may change the effect that controlling corruption 
has on asset growth. Again, the multicollinearity between LAW, STABILITY, VOICE, EFFECT and 
QUALITY precludes the inclusion of more than one of these variables in the regression equation, so 
we  fit  a  series  of  regressions,  each  with  a  single  on  of  these  governance  indicators.  Now  the 
regression with the best fit is the one incorporating STABILITY. The results from fitting the model 
with STABILITY are reported in Tables 3-4; the results using alternative governance indicators are 
reported in Appendix Table A2. The Table 3-4 results are based on a model of the form: 
 
GROWTHit = t + i + ∙GROWTHit-1 + ∙ AGEit + [0 + 1 ∙ AGEit] DEFAULTit      (2) 
  + [0 + 1 ∙ AGEit + 2 ∙ GOVERNMENTit + 3 ∙ FOREIGNit] CONTROLit  
  + [0 + 1 ∙ AGEit + 2 ∙ GOVERNMENTit + 3 ∙ FOREIGNit] STABILITYit  
  +  ∙ GDPGRit + uit 
   
The coefficient  captures the effect on asset growth of overall economic growth, as captured by the 
rate of growth of real GDP; the parameters 2 and 3 capture the effect of bank ownership on the 
impact of corruption on asset growth, while 2 and 3 capture the effect of bank ownership on the 
impact of political stability on asset growth.
6 Equation (2) contains many interaction terms, and does 
not provide a direct estimate of the average effect of  CONTROL and STABILITY on asset growth. 
For this reason, we also fit a model with the restriction 1 = 2 = 3 = 1 = 2 = 3 = 0. The restricted 
version of the model is reported in Table 3, and the unrestricted version in Table 4. Given the 
correlation between CONTROL and STABILITY, Table 3 also reports the results of imposing the 
additional restrictions 0 = 0 and 0 = 0. 
Since equations (1-2) represent dynamic panel models, we must allow for the endogeneity of the 
lagged dependent variable. We should also allow for the fact that DEFAULT may be endogenous to 
                                                 
6 The ownership variables appear only in interaction terms. If these variables are included in the model as additively 
separable terms, the coefficients on them are insignificantly different form zero. 10 
 
RATIO or GROWTH. Tables 2-4 report parameters estimated using the two-step GMM estimator of 
Arellano and Bond (1991). Lags up to order three are used as instruments for the lagged dependent 
variable and up to order two as instruments for DEFAULT and AGE ∙ DEFAULT. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Tables 2-4 contain the empirical results. Tables 2 present the results on the loans-assets ratio. Tables 
3-4 present the results of models explaining bank asset growth. Supplementary results are provided 
in Appendix Tables A1-A2.  
Table 2 presents regression results corresponding to equation (2). It can be seen from the table that 
other regression coefficients are almost completely invariant to the restrictions 0 = 1 = 0 and 0 + 
1 = 0. The estimated effect of CONTROL on RATIO does not depend on whether LAW is included in 
the model, and the estimated effect of LAW on RATIO does not depend on whether CONTROL is 
included in the model.  
The table provides strong evidence that high default rates represent a major obstacle to bank lending 
in the UEMOA. The coefficient of the default rate (DEFAULT) is negative and highly significant in 
all three models and is economically very large. This effect diminishes with the age of the bank, as 
indicated by the positive sign of the interaction of the default rate with bank age (AGE ∙ DEFAULT). 
However, the relative size of the coefficients suggest that bank age needs to be around 40 before the 
bank has enough information capital to overcome the adverse selection effect. For the  youngest 
banks, a percentage point increase in defaults as a fraction of total loans leads to a reduction in the 
fraction of assets that are loaned of around 0.6 percentage points. 
The table shows a negative coefficient on the rule of law variable (LAW) and a positive coefficient 
on the interaction term AGE ∙ LAW. The loans-assets ratio of young banks falls when the rule of law 
improves, while the loans-assets ratio of older banks rises. These effects are statistically significant. 
For banks older than 15 years old, improving rule of law has a positive effect on the loans-assets 
ratio.  These results  are  consistent  with  the  conjecture that very  young  banks  face high costs in 
identifying reliable borrowers, so the growth in deposits following a rise in stability outstrips their 
capacity to make new loans. The coefficient on control of corruption (CONTROL) is statistically 
insignificant,  but  the  interaction  AGE  ∙  CONTROL  is  positive  and  statistically  significant.  This 
suggests that control of corruption has a greater impact on older banks‟ willingness to lend than on 
that of younger banks. Overall, improvements in both the rule of law and control of corruption have 
a  positive  effect  on  the  loans-assets  ratio  of  older  banks,  but  the  effects  on  younger  banks  are 
negative or insignificant.   11 
 
The coefficient on the linearly separable  AGE term is statistically significant. The coefficient is 
around 0.01, implying that an extra year in operation increases the loans-assets ratio by about one 
percentage point for a bank in a country with governance variables equal to zero (the worldwide 
mean).  For  banks  in  countries  with  governance  variables  below  the  worldwide  mean,  as  they 
typically are in our sample, the effect is somewhat smaller. The coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable is around 0.2-0.3, and significantly greater than zero, implying that there is some persistence 
in the loans-assets ratio. If there is a shock to the ratio in the current year, 20-30% of the effect will 
persist into the following year, and about 5-10% into the year after that. 
Tables  3-4  contain  the  results  of  different  specifications  of  our  asset  growth  model.  The  tables 
include results using political stability (STABILITY) alongside control of corruption (CONTROL) as 
governance  indicators.  Of  the  other  governance  variables,  only  rule  of  law  was  found  to  be 
significant  in  any  specification.  Results  using  alternative  governance  indicators  are  reported  in 
Appendix Table A2. In Table 3 interaction terms with governance variables are excluded, while in 
Table 4 we allow for the possibility that the age and ownership structure of a bank modifies the 
impact of control of corruption and political stability on its asset growth. 
The negative coefficient on DEFAULT in Table 3 indicates that loan defaults represent a serious 
obstacle  to  the  growth  of  bank  balance  sheets.  The  positive  and  significant  coefficient  on  the 
interaction term AGE ∙ DEFAULT indicates that this effect is declining with the age of the bank. 
However, for banks younger than 30 years (almost all of the banks in our sample), the overall effect 
of an increase in DEFAULT on GROWTH is negative, indicating that all but the very oldest banks 
have insufficient information capital to counteract the negative effect of high default rate. For the 
youngest  banks,  a  percentage  point  increase  in  defaults  as  a  fraction  of  total  loans  leads  to  a 
reduction in asset growth of over 1.5 percentage points. For the oldest banks, the effect of DEFAULT 
on GROWTH is insignificantly different from zero.  
Age has a negative effect on asset growth: younger banks grow faster than older banks, indicating 
some convergence in bank size over time. (However, the positive coefficient on AGE ∙ DEFAULT 
indicates that this convergence effect is attenuated by high default rates.) Growth in real GDP has a 
positive  effect  on  asset  growth,  reflecting  the  macroeconomic  relationship  between  finance  and 
economic development. The coefficient on GDPGR is insignificantly different from unity, implying 
that a percentage point increase in GDP growth leads to a percentage point increase in asset growth. 
As one might expect, there is a positive and significant coefficient on STABILITY in Table 3: on 
average, banks grow more when there is political stability. This effect does not depend on whether 12 
 
CONTROL is included in the regression. Such a categorical result does not apply to the effect of 
CONTROL. When STABILITY is excluded from the model, the effect of CONTROL on GROWTH is 
insignificantly different form zero. However, when STABILITY is included alongside CONTROL, the 
coefficient on the latter is both negative and statistically significant. On average, greater political 
stability tend to be associated with more control of corruption; however, for a given level of political 
stability, more control of corruption leads to lower asset growth, on average. In order to see why this 
is the case we need to move to Table 4, which includes interaction terms in the governance variables. 
The model in Table 4 allows the effects of control of corruption and political stability to vary across 
different types of bank. The interaction terms allow the effects of governance to vary not only with 
bank age, but also with the type of bank ownership. In the case of STABILITY, the interaction terms 
produce variables that are so highly collinear that none is statistically significant (Model 1). For this 
reason, we report the results from a second regression equation in which the STABILITY interaction 
terms are excluded. In this regression (Model 2), the coefficient on STABILITY is similar in sign and 
statistical significance to the corresponding coefficient in Table 3. Political stability appears to affect 
the asset growth of all banks the same way, irrespective of age or ownership type. By contrast, all of 
the interaction terms in CONTROL are statistically significant. Control of corruption affects different 
types of bank in a different way. It has the greatest positive impact on the youngest domestically 
owned private banks. Its impact declines with the age of the bank and the degree of foreign or 
government ownership. Its effects on the growth of wholly foreign or government owned banks are 
negative,  irrespective  of  the  bank‟s  age.  One  interpretation  of  these  results  is  that  control  of 
corruption reduces the savings of the corrupt political elite, who are customers of the old, state-
owned and foreign (French) banks. At the same time, it increases the savings of those outside the 
elite, who are customers of young, private banks. However, the first effect outweighs the second, so 
the control of corruption is associated with lower asset growth overall (Table 3). 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Our results suggest that a major factor explaining why banks in Africa choose to remain excessively 
liquid is a high default rate among borrowers. The same factor appears to be a serious obstacle to the 
growth  of  bank  balance  sheets.  Our  results  also  suggest  that  older  banks  suffer  less  from  this 
problem, which is consistent with an information capital explanation of why banks are reluctant to 
lend. The greater the information capital of a bank, the more willing it would be to lend all other 
things equal.  To the extent that financial development is expected to come from the emergence and 
growth of new banks, this problem can be addressed through the development of credit bureaus and 13 
 
other mechanisms that help improve information on prospective borrowers (IMF, 2001; Sacerdoti, 
2005). 
Perhaps our most interesting result is that control of corruption has very different effects on different 
types of banks. It is most effective for promoting the growth of young privately owned domestic 
banks. At the other end of the spectrum, it actually deters the growth of foreign or government 
owned  banks,  irrespective  of  age.  This  suggests  that  control  of  corruption  creates  a  more  level 
playing field which encourages the emergence and growth of new banks. Since new banks are likely 
to take away business from the more established banks, control of corruption may act as a deterrent 
to the growth of older banks.  A similar explanation may be offered for the effects of corruption on 
different types of ownership. Control of corruption may create a more level playing field which 
benefits private banks that are less likely to be well connected to the establishment that foreign or 
government owned banks. Hence, privately owned banks grow at the expense of government or 
foreign owned banks when control of corruption is increased. These results are consistent with the 
interest  groups  explanation  of  financial  under-development  put  forward  by  Rajan  and  Zingales 
(2003). Older banks, especially those owned by foreigners or the state, are closer to the establishment 
than younger domestically owned private banks. They stand to lose by competition by new banks 
which erodes their rents. Hence, they have an incentive to block the entry and growth of new banks. 
A corrupt environment offers more opportunities for them to succeed in doing so.  
In our dataset, the positive effect that control of corruption has on the growth of new privately owned 
banks  is  mitigated  not  only  by  the  reduction  in  the  growth  of  older  banks,  but  also  by  the 
informational constraints that affect the younger banks more than the older banks. Hence, at the 
aggregate level, it is by no means obvious that control of corruption will have beneficial effects on 
the  growth  of  the  banking  system,  unless  it  is  also  accompanied  by  policies  that  improve  the 
informational  capital  of  new  banks.  This  is  clearly  a  question  on  which  further  theoretical  and 
empirical research would be useful. The finding that younger banks face more severe informational 
constraints is consistent with Love and Mylenko (2003), who find that public credit registries benefit 
younger firms more than older firms. 
Our findings are much less ambiguous when it comes to political stability, which we have found to 
have an unequivocally positive effect on banking development. Political stability seems to affect all 
banks in the same way. Improvements in political stability, as well as in information capital and 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
  observations  mean    s.d.  minimum  maximum 
RATIO  482   0.57    0.20   0.00   0.96 
GROWTH  487   5.52    1.58   1.43   8.37 
DEFAULT  588   0.14    0.08   0.05   0.42 
FOREIGN  582   0.54    0.36   0.00   1.00 
GOVERNMENT  582   0.16    0.25   0.00   1.00 
AGE  588   17.3   16.1   0.00   106 
VOICE  588  -0.45    0.65  -1.54   0.41 
STABILITY  588  -0.45    0.82  -2.45   0.71 
EFFECT  588  -0.68    0.40  -1.44   0.04 
QUALITY  588  -0.44    0.24  -1.00  -0.06 
LAW  588  -0.67    0.44  -1.57  -0.04 
CONTROL  588  -0.56    0.37  -1.24   0.12 
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Table 2: Alternative Models of the Loans-Assets Ratio (RATIO) 
 
The table reports GMM coefficients using lags up to order 3 as instruments for the lagged dependent 
variable and up to order 2 as instruments for the default variables. Year fixed effects are also used. 
Standard errors are in italics, and coefficients significant at the 5% level are in bold. 
 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3 
Adverse selection 
DEFAULT 
-0.6115  -0.6688  -0.6542 
0.2153  0.2168  0.2098 
AGE × DEFAULT 
0.0183  0.0157  0.0171 
0.0052  0.0052  0.0050 
Moral hazard 
LAW 
-0.1253     -0.1134 
0.0495     0.0570 
AGE × LAW 
0.0078     0.0064 
0.0017     0.0022 
CONTROL 
   -0.0585  -0.0071 
   0.0359  0.0388 
AGE × CONTROL 
   0.0078  0.0031 
   0.0013  0.0015 
Conditioning variables  
RATIO-1 
0.2182  0.3273  0.2314 
0.0575  0.0596  0.0614 
AGE 
0.0118  0.0084  0.0129 
0.0024  0.0013  0.0025 
Summary and diagnostic statistics  
Number of observations  290  290  290 
Standard error  0.0091  0.0097  0.0091 
Sargan Test (p value)  0.1381  0.2359  0.1321 
1st-order serial correlation (p value)  0.0062  0.0037  0.0080 
2nd-order serial correlation (p value)  0.9305  0.9747  0.9305 
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Table 3: Alternative Models of Real Asset Growth (GROWTH) 
 
The table reports GMM coefficients using lags up to order 3 as instruments for the lagged dependent 
variable and up to order 2 as instruments for the default variables. Year fixed effects are also used. 
Standard errors are in italics, and coefficients significant at the 5% level are in bold. 
 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2  MODEL 3 
Adverse selection 
DEFAULT 
-1.9910  -1.7502  -1.7707 
0.5527  0.5107  0.4936 
AGE × DEFAULT 
0.0588  0.0488  0.0586 
0.0166  0.0153  0.0162 
Moral hazard 
STABILITY 
0.1280    0.1271 
0.0370    0.0364 
CONTROL    -0.1806  -0.1885 
 
0.0932  0.0812 
Conditioning variables  
GROWTH-1 
0.0522  0.0597  0.0565 
0.0755  0.0769  0.0744 
AGE 
-0.0073  -0.0070  -0.0075 
0.0015  0.0015  0.0015 
GDPGR 
1.0000  1.0753  0.8340 
0.4844  0.4348  0.4574 
Summary and diagnostic statistics  
Number of observations  213  213  213 
Standard error  0.0557  0.0570  0.0557 
Sargan Test (p value)  0.4189  0.2268  0.3704 
1st-order serial correlation (p value)  0.0055  0.0051  0.0046 
2nd-order serial correlation (p value)  0.8525  0.4415  0.7292 
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Table 4: Models of Real Asset Growth including Interaction Terms 
 
The table reports GMM coefficients using lags up to order 3 as instruments for the lagged dependent 
variable and up to order 2 as instruments for the default variables. Year fixed effects are also used. 
Standard errors are in italics, and coefficients significant at the 5% level are in bold. 
 
  MODEL 1  MODEL 2 
Adverse selection 
DEFAULT 
-1.6304  -1.6703 
0.5561  0.4757 
AGE × DEFAULT 
0.0658  0.0637 
0.0212  0.0139 
Moral hazard 
STABILITY 
0.1042  0.1408 
0.1421  0.0389 
AGE × STABILITY 
-0.0008   
0.0032 
 
GOVERNMENT × STABILITY 
0.1943   
0.1429   
FOREIGN × STABILITY 
-0.0436   
0.1586   
CONTROL 
0.6503  0.6793 
0.2073  0.1959 
AGE × CONTROL 
-0.0076  -0.0105 
0.0059  0.0020 
GOVERNMENT × CONTROL 
-0.9929  -0.9876 
0.2839  0.3034 
FOREIGN × CONTROL 
-1.1266  -1.0518 
0.3316  0.3404 
Conditioning variables  
GROWTH-1 
0.0147  0.0352 
0.0697  0.0723 
AGE 
-0.0173  -0.0185 
0.0027  0.0022 
GDPGR 
0.8984  0.9015 
0.4260  0.4528 
Summary and diagnostic statistics  
Number of observations  213  213 
Standard error  0.0535  0.0543 
Sargan Test (p value)  0.5448  0.5503 
1st-order serial correlation (p value)  0.0161  0.0071 
2nd-order serial correlation (p value)  0.6348  0.3957 20 
 
Appendix: Alternative Models of the Loans-Assets Ratio and of Real Asset Growth 
 
This appendix includes alternative regression equations in which the governance indicators used in 
Tables 2-3 are replaced by alternative indicators.  Table A1 supplements Table 2, and Table A2 
supplements Table 3.  
Table  A1  presents  results  from  models  of  the  loans-assets  ratio  that  replace  LAW  with  one  of 
STABILITY, VOICE, EFFECT and QUALITY. In all four cases, the equation standard errors are 
higher than in Table 2. In all four cases, the estimated effects of the governance indices are positive 
at AGE = 0 but declining in AGE. However, the associated standard errors are quite high, and for 
most  values  of  AGE  the  marginal  effect  of  a  change  in  the  value  of  the  governance  index  is 
insignificantly different from zero. None of the coefficients on four alternative governance indices is 
statistically significant when LAW is added to the regression. The coefficients on all of the other 
variables in Table A1 are quite similar to the equivalent coefficients in Table 2. The coefficient on 
the  default rate is  negative and highly significant  as  before,  although it  exhibits  some variation 
according  to  the  governance  indicator  used  in  the  regression.  The  coefficients  on  AGE  and           
AGE  ∙  DEFAULT  remain  positive  and  significant,  suggesting  that  the  information  capital  story 
remains intact.   
Table  A2  shows  that  the  only  governance  indicator  other  than  STABILITY  having  a  significant 
impact on GROWTH is LAW; all other indicators are statistically insignificant.  Although the LAW 
coefficient is positive and significant, it loses all significance when LAW it is included in a regression 
alongside STABILITY.  
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Table A1: More Models of the Loans-Assets Ratio (RATIO) 
 
The table reports GMM coefficients using lags up to order 3 as instruments for the lagged dependent 
variable and up to order 2 as instruments for the default variables. Year fixed effects are also used. 
Standard errors are in italics, and coefficients significant at the 5% level are in bold. 
 
  type of institution 
  VOICE  STABILITY  EFFECT  QUALITY 
Adverse selection 
DEFAULT 
-0.7440  -0.6605  -0.2954  -0.3660 
0.2548  0.2092  0.2630  0.2261 
AGE × DEFAULT 
0.0172  0.0136  0.0009  0.0063 
0.0073  0.0067  0.0081  0.0064 
Moral hazard 
institution 
0.1486  0.0538  0.1277  0.1022 
0.1132  0.0267  0.0692  0.0708 
AGE × institution 
-0.0014  -0.0013  -0.0050  -0.0089 
0.0036  0.0012  0.0020  0.0030 
CONTROL 
-0.0661  -0.0609  -0.1604  -0.1330 
0.0290  0.0405  0.0554  0.0538 
AGE × CONTROL 
0.0080  0.0087  0.0135  0.0131 
0.0017  0.0027  0.0034  0.0034 
Conditioning variables  
RATIO-1 
0.3105  0.3190  0.2980  0.3830 
0.0604  0.0566  0.0665  0.0623 
AGE 
0.0066  0.0070  0.0108  0.0081 
0.0036  0.0016  0.0022  0.0018 
Summary and diagnostic statistics  
Number of observations  290  290  290  290 
Standard error  0.0098  0.0098  0.0094  0.0100 
Sargan Test (p value)  0.3000  0.3083  0.3111  0.1241 
1st-order serial correlation (p value)  0.0041  0.0032  0.0031  0.0013 
2nd-order serial correlation (p value)  0.9100  0.6945  0.9052  0.6896 
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Table A2: More Models of Real Asset Growth (GROWTH) 
 
The table reports GMM coefficients using lags up to order 3 as instruments for the lagged dependent 
variable and up to order 2 as instruments for the default variables. Year fixed effects are also used. 
Standard errors are in italics, and coefficients significant at the 5% level are in bold. 
 
  type of institution 
  VOICE  LAW  EFFECT  QUALITY 
Adverse selection 
DEFAULT 
-1.7600  -1.7496  -1.7845  -2.0338 
0.5444  0.5505  0.5037  0.5440 
AGE × DEFAULT 
0.0430  0.0408  0.0480  0.0538 
0.0168  0.0173  0.0152  0.0173 
Moral hazard 
institution 
-0.1678  0.2664  -0.0180  0.1442 
0.1397  0.1208  0.0984  0.1003 
CONTROL 
-0.1398  -0.1659  -0.1628  -0.1197 
0.1102  0.0901  0.0983  0.0915 
Conditioning variables  
GROWTH-1 
0.0345  0.0607  0.0744  0.0291 
0.0709  0.0751  0.0776  0.0736 
AGE 
-0.0063  -0.0056  -0.0068  -0.0072 
0.0016  0.0017  0.0015  0.0016 
GDPGR 
1.1254  0.8440  0.8221  1.0462 
0.4479  0.4271  0.4524  0.4633 
Summary and diagnostic statistics  
Number of observations  213  213  213  213 
Standard error  0.0560  0.0572  0.0581  0.0559 
Sargan Test (p value)  0.2485  0.5040  0.1118  0.1329 
1st-order serial correlation (p value)  0.0063  0.0042  0.0040  0.0059 
2nd-order serial correlation (p value)  0.4200  0.5738  0.3573  0.6899 
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Figure 6: distribution of private domestic share in bank ownership